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Abstract 
Motivated by the debate on concentration-stability nexus, this paper studies the impact of bank concentration on the 
likelihood of a country suffering systemic bank fragility. For this reason, we followed a new approach using on-site bank 
balance sheet information to construct our proxy that represent each bank stability condition and use a variety of internal 
and external factors to estimate a balance panel dynamic two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) approach for the 
period 2008 – 2015. First, results provide supportive evidence consistent with the concentration-fragility view. Second, 
macroeconomic variables seem to have a significant effect on bank stability, which is not found for the sovereignty primary 
risk. By contrast, the bank-specific variables have also a significant effect on bank stability conditions. Finally, non-systemic 
banks are found to be more sensitive to macroeconomic condition and market concentration, while the better capitalised 
banks are less sensitive to fragility at the expense of lower operation efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 has not only shaken most of the financial market and 
institutions, but also has risen fundamental issues about the market power, such as concentration or 
market share, especially the role of bank equity capital, particularly from the standpoint of bank 
survival [Mirzaei, et al., (2011)]. Not surprisingly, public outcries for more bank capital tend to be 
greater after GFC, since bank with more capital had a greater probability of survival [Berger and 
Bouwman, (2013)] and can have significant positive impact on the efficiency and innovation of the 
production of financial services [Claessens and Laeven (2004)]. Indeed, bankers often assess their 
performance relatively to each other on the basis of market share, even though they often argue that 
greater market share may jeopardize their performance [Berger and Bouwman, (2013)] and the 
implications of having banks that are too-big-to-fail continues to rage the financial sector on the whole 
[Beck, et al., (2006)]. But, if many small banks behave aggressively and recklessly to their aim for 
higher market share and therefore get into bank distress at the same time, together they may also be 
too important to fail [De Haan and Poghosyan, (2012)]. 
 
Both country experience and the academic debates suggest that higher market share or/and market 
concentration has an ambiguous effect on bank stability [Kasman and Carvallo, (2014)]. The empirical 
literature dealing with this issue shows two possible connections in the sense that the concentration 
may promote stability [Beck, et al., (2006); Evrensel, (2008); De Haan and Poghosyan, (2012)], as it 
can also be a source of bank fragility [Boyd, and De Nicoló, (2005); Boyd, et al., (2006); Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, (2009); Fu, et al., (2014); Pawlowska (2016)], which are mostly costly for developing 
countries [Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002)]. However, whether banking concentration is a source of 
stability or, on the contrary, an amplification factor of banking crises, this subject requires particular 
attention because the financial situation of banks heavily affects the performance of the real economy 
(Dell’Ariccia, et al., (2008), Kroszner, et al., (2008), particularly since the GFC, which has affected 
the global financial system, particularly the banking sector, deeply, with many banks suffering large 
losses and needing to raise additional capital [Kasman and Kasman, (2015)]. To that the financial 
liberalisation and the restructuring efforts of the last decade has changed the concentration conditions 
in the banking sector.  
 
This shortcoming becomes even more important in fragmented banking system, such as that in 
Albania, where a large number of banks operate in a specific small opened economy. In particular, the 
Albanian banking system showed an apparent resilience during the GFC. In particular, improving 
market conditions and legislation and macroeconomic state of the economy, motivated larger foreign 
banks in more developed countries, most in the Eurozone, operating at relatively low margins to 
extend cross-border operations into potentially new and more profitable market. However, increasing 
competition has been considered the main driving force behind the acceleration in the consolidating 
process, and it is also raising concerns about increased concentration in the banking sector as it is often 
criticised for being “overbanked”.  
 
The last decade has witnessed dynamic growth within the banking assets. The value of the assets of 
the entire banking sector is equivalent to 90% of the Albania Gross Domestic Production (GDP). 
Additionally, before the GFC we observed a sharp increase in lending, which shifted their focus 
towards increasing profits while ceasing to monitor and properly assess risk. At the same time, the 
problems of banks being “too-big-too-fail has also emerged, especially in terms of market share as the 
6 largest banks (systemic banks as defined by the Bank of Albania) holds nearly 80% of the market. 
To that, still at a ratio of nearly 16.2% for the whole market and 22.2% for the systemic banks, 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman indices suggest that the banking sector is "moderately concentrated". 
Similarly, despite accommodating policies by Bank of Albania to lower market concentration, still 
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tendency towards a more concentrated market is found to be associated or even foreheads banking 
system fragility (See also Graph 1 in Appendix). Unlike the US and European counterparts, and 
similar to the Asia Pacific banking industry [Fu, et al., (2014)], the Albanian banking system emerged 
from the GFC in a relatively stable position without requiring anywhere near the same degree of 
government support and bailouts. These patterns make it a particularly interesting environment in 
which to study the concentration-stability nexus in banking.  
 
Against this background, the existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review of the main 
internal and external determinants on bank stability, but of these cases still one question need to be 
answered empirically as there is no evidence on how market concentration effects bank stability, in 
particular in the case of an emerging economy, namely Albania. Therefore, this paper analysis the 
concentration-stability nexus for 16 banks operating in the Albanian financial sector over the period 
2008 – 2015. For these reason we follows a five-step procedure. First, we constructed a composite 
individual stability indicator by compelling the on-site bank balance sheet information and expressed 
it as a function of internal and external variables using an unbalance panel with quarterly data for the 
period 2008 Q04 – 2015 Q03. Then, we used a dynamic two-step General Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach, particularly the first difference transformation approach. Additionally, empirical 
analysis is accomplished through a set of robustness check. First, we analyse our benchmark model, 
which includes macroeconomic, market-specific and bank-specific factors. Then we extend our 
research to analyse for market concentration behaviour either by augmenting further our benchmark 
model or with regards to other sectors, especially those related to liabilities, deposits and loan. This in 
return provides an alternative approach to conclude also on the robustness of our model. Finally, we 
also assess the sensitivity of our model specification to methodological changes.  
 
By way of preview, our empirical results suggest that greater bank concentration tends to enhance the 
likelihood that a country will suffer systemic bank fragility, which supports the concentration-fragility 
theory. Improving macroeconomic is found to boost bank stability, which was not found to be the case 
with regards to primary sovereignty risk. Among the bank-specific factors, operational efficiency and 
the capital structure of the bank are found to be relatively important components. At the same time, we 
also spitted the sample among systemic and non-systemic banks. The latter are found to be more 
sensitive to market concentration and macroeconomic condition. The former places great concerns to 
operational efficiency, while capital structure seems to be of less relevance compared to non-systemic 
banks.  
 
This paper complements and extends existing literature on this issue in several aspects. First, to the 
best of our knowledge this is the first study to investigate empirically the concentration environment 
of universal banks in Albania, considering both cross sectional time-series dataset for individual banks 
and focusing only on the period after the GFC. Thus, the results of the study may highlight the impact 
of the global turmoil on individual bank risk exposure. Analysing this issue is important because 
banking system is the most prominent agents in the financial markets which provide a wide range of 
financial services to the economic anchors that may be vulnerable to bank instability. In contrast to 
many studies in this literature, Albania as a developing country provides a fertile laboratory to 
examining concentration-stability nexus since the country has engaged in a process of greater 
structural reforms and liberalisation process, privatisation, economic integration and technological 
change, while the system is witnessing more consolidation and was not directly affected by the GFC. 
Third, since it focuses only on a single country, it avoids any pitfall as described by Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) related to data issues and ensure comparability across both dependent and 
independent variables. Nor do we use data from the Bankscope database. Moreover, different from 
previous empirical work, this paper does neither focused on real episodes of banking crises nor use 
binary approach as a proxy for instability episodes, or use the Z-score or credit risk as an in-variant 
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measure of the bank’s risk-taking behaviour and distance to solvency, to which Fu, et al., (2014) 
provides some arguments against. In fact, we extend empirical findings by including instead a more 
sophisticated proxy for bank stability that is based on a wide set of consolidated balance sheet data and 
the principal component analyses approach as explained by Shijaku (2016). The other contribution of 
this paper is that it also extend and enhance previous findings by using instrument variables regressed 
to address likely reverse causality due to probable two-sided relationship between concentration and 
bank stability. Finally, we provide appropriate evidence, by fragmentising this sector according to the 
size of the banks, addressing whether certain institutions show different concentration behaviour than 
others. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review on the structure of banking sector 
in Albania. Section 3 presents the related theoretical and empirical literature review on the banking 
market concentration and bank stability nexus. Section 4 presents the methodology, data description 
and estimation approach. The empirical results of the estimations are reported in Section 5. Finally, the 
paper’s concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The relationship between concentration and banking stability has been a controversial issue long 
before the GFC started. Both at theoretical and empirical level, the issue remain ambiguous and 
unresolved, despite a large body of literature.  
 
2.1. THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
The theoretical literature concerted around two major streams with utterly opposite conclusions. They 
are arranged according to whether they support the idea that banking concentration has a stabilizing 
effect (concentration-stability view) or whether on the contrary it has a destabilising effect 
(concentration-fragility hypothesis).  
 
The concentration-stability paradigm, which is also referred to as the franchise value paradigm 
proposed first by Keeley (1990), argues, on a (positive) margin effect hypothesis, that banks operating 
in a concentrated market signal or that have some market power (i.e. positive franchise value) might 
be more prudent in the aspect of risk-taking. It is assumed that larger banks tend to undertake “credit 
rationing” since fewer, but more qualitative credit investments will increase the return of the singular 
investment and hence foster financial soundness [Boot, et al., (2000)]. Similarly, banks in concentrated 
banking system may enhance profits, through either higher interest rates or less loan loss provision, 
[Boyd, et al., (2004)] as the higher the franchise value of the greater the opportunity cost of bank when 
going bankrupt, and therefore risky investments that could jeopardize future profits may not be 
accepted by banks authorities [Hellmann, et al., (2000)]. Higher profits, on the other hand, may 
provide higher “capital buffer” that protects them from adverse external macroeconomic, loan losses 
and liquidity shocks and eventually increase the charter or franchise value of the bank, reducing the 
incentives for banks to take excessive and unwarranted risk and thus reducing the probability of 
default [Beck, et al., (2006); Berger and Bouwman, (2013)]. Further, larger banks may even be able to 
diversify (even geographically) loan portfolio risks more efficiently due to higher economies of scale 
[Diamond, (1984); Uhde and Heimeshoff, (2009)]. In another aspect, as Allen and Gale, (2004) states, 
it would also prove substantially easier for bank supervisors to monitor a few banks in a concentrated 
banking system in which a few larger banks hold more diversified portfolios. Such a concentrated 
banking system‘s resilience to higher risk absorption would be more pronounced, leading to fewer 
crises.  
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In contrast, proponent of the “concentration-fragility view” argue that banks operating in a more 
concentrated environments, exploiting arbitrary their monopoly power in the loan market, tend to 
induce higher loan rates [Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)], which in return, create moral hazards and 
eliminate the least risky part of the banks’ customers [Berger, et al., (2009)], or even make it harder 
for them to repay loans [Mirzaei, et al., (2012)]. In this context, default risk will surge, while large 
banks are of particular importance because their failure could pose significant risks to the collapse of 
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole, as the crisis in US has shown [De Haana and 
Poghosyan, 2012)]. This could also negatively affect the monetary system and real production. To 
ensure financial stability, those institutions considered as “too-big-to-fail” might implicitly or 
explicitly be protected by public guarantees or subsidies, as observed during and in the aftermath of 
GFC [Moch, (2013)], which in return may intensify risk-taking incentives and hence increase banking 
fragility [Mishkin, (1999)]. In another aspect, Cetorelli, et al., (2007) stress that a lower degree of 
diversification may end up deteriorating managerial efficiency, less effective internal corporate control 
and increased operational risk that may be prone to supervisory failures.    
 
2.2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
In line with appropriate theoretical literature even empirical work is ambiguous on the relationship 
between market concentration and stability in the banking system. As an important challenge to the 
franchise value paradigm, Demsetz, et al., (1996), following Keeley, (1990) use the Tobin’s q as an 
indicator of market power and examine the role of franchise value on risk-taking behaviour of bank in 
U.S. over the period 1986-1994. Both authors report empirical evidence on the support of 
concentration-stability view as they find a negative relationship between franchise value and risk. 
Similarly, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) also develop a model, modifying one presented by Allen and 
Gale (2004), explaining that in a concentrated market banks tend to be more risk-taking and an 
increase in concentration both in loan and deposit markets brings in higher loan rates charged to 
borrowers. Beck, et al., (2006) examine the link between market concentration and banking crises 
using country-specific data on individual bank failures and reports by national supervisory agencies 
and a concentration index based on total assets held by the largest three banks in each country, using a 
dataset on 69 countries for the period 1980-1997, and in contrast to De Nicolo, et al., (2004) found that 
crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems.  
 
De Haan and Poghosyan (2012b) use quarterly data, for the US banking system for the period 1995-
2010. Similarly, Boyd, et al., (2006) use measures of bank profitability, namely return on asset (RoA) 
and return on equity (RoE), and Z-Index and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) as proxy for 
bank risk and concentration respectively assessing the joint effects of market structure and risk on 
profitability
2
. The authors provide empirical evidence supporting the risk-shifting as earnings volatility 
decreases with market concentration. On the other hand, different to Matutes and Vives (2000), using 
data from 2600 banks across the EU-25 over the period 1997-2005 and similar to Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) found that banking market concentration has a negative impact on European 
banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score, but is associated with a positive effect on 
banks profitability as measured by RoA. To that, using a unique dataset for the Spanish banking 
system, Jimenez, et al., (2013) report that standard measure of market concentration do not affect the 
non-performing loan, proxy for bank risk, but found evidence in favour of the franchise value 
paradigm when using the Lerner indexes. 
 
The empirical literature has also supports the possibility of a negative correlation showing that a 
concentrated market could have a destabilizing effect on financial stability by making reference to the 
                                                          
2 Other papers using the Z-score and HHI as measurement of bank risk and concentration are de Haan and Poghosyan (2012a); Mirzaei, et 
al., (2012); Fu, et al., (2014); Kasman and Kasman (2015); Căpraru and Andrieş, (2015); Fernández, et al., (2016). 
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“too-big-too-fail” hypothesis. Nickell, et al., (1997) finds that firms enjoying market power tend to 
operate inefficiently rather than to reap all potential rents. The study by Boyd, et al., (2006), based on 
the HHI and Z-score for a cross-section of 2500 small rural banks operating in the U.S. and a panel of 
134 countries over the period 1993-2004, shows that the effect of riskier portfolios dominates despite 
increased revenues related to the concentration of the banking sector. This study has been extended by 
De Nicolo and Loukiaonova (2007) using data from 133 non-industrialised countries over the period 
1993-2004. They find that the result is stronger when bank ownership is taken into account. Schaeck, 
et al., (2009) using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistics and standard deviation of concentration 
measure for 38 countries over the period 1980-2033, using the logit approach. The authors present 
evidence of a concentration-fragility view. Pawlowska (2016) investigates the role of market 
concentration, measure through Z-score and HHI, and loan risk, as measured by NPL, by spitting a 
sample of annual data for each banking sector in the EU-27 countries with regards to their total assets 
into largest banking sectors (i.e., EU-15) the smallest banking sectors (i.e., EU-12) and a sample 
including all of the EU-27. The paper finds evidence that banking sectors within EU are not 
homogenous and there is also asymmetry between the performances of EU-15. The author reports also 
evidence for the existence of a “too-big-to-fail” effect within EU-15 banking sectors. In their analysis 
of 440 international domestic and cross-border mergers that took place between 1991 and 2009, Weiß, 
et al., (2014) find clear empirical evidence for a significant increase in both the idiosyncratic default 
and the systemic risk of acquirers following bank mergers, thus confirming the “concentration-
fragility” hypothesis. 
 
Finally, a third way reconciles the two strands demonstrates there exists a nonlinear relationship 
between concentration and stability. Recently, in addition to Caminal and Matutes, (2002), Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010) encompass both of these competing approaches by proposing a nonlinear 
relationship between concentration on the assumption that less concentration may reduce the 
borrower’s probability of default (risk-shifting effect), but also the interest payments from performing 
loans, which serve as a buffer to cover loan losses (margin effects). They find evidence that a U-
shaped relationship between concentration and stability could exist. Hence, the probability of default 
first goes down but then rises after a certain point as bank competition increases. Similarly, Berger, et 
al., (2009) test the impact of market structure on risk potential of 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations 
using a nonlinear relationship between financial stability and market structure. Their results provide 
some support, consistent with the "concentration-fragility view” that market power increases loan 
portfolio risk. The authors show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios. 
 
Overall, the existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review of the effects of market power, 
financial structure and the bank activity determinants on banking stability in an individual country or 
panel of countries, but some questions in the aspect of the emerging market still need to be answered 
empirically, in particular to the period after the global financial crisis.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY, VARIABLES AND DATA 
3.1. BENCHMARK MODEL SPECIFICATION APPROACH 
 
The empirical model specification draws on the extensive review of previous studies, but it also 
departs from Shijaku (2016) who investigated the link between market share and bank stability. 
However, as in the case of Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), in this paper our empirical analysis considers 
the link between concentration and instead of market power. The model is specified as follows:  
 
  (1) 
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Where,  is a stability indicator of bank i at time t, with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T. α is a 
constant term.  is a vector of explanatory variables grouped into three main categories: (1) 
 is a set of bank-specific explanatory variables;  is a set of industry explanatory 
variables;  is a set of control variables that account for state of economy; β is a 
vector of coefficients to be estimated.  is an error terms that is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed with mean of 0 and variance .  
 
The model is estimated through means a dynamic two-step General Method of Moments (GMM), 
particularly the first difference transformation approach as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991)
3
 to 
the assumption this would eliminate endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables with the 
dependent variable and the individual fixed effects [Anderson and Hsiao (1981)] and inconsistent of 
small sample time [Han and Phillips, (2010)]. Then, based on Roodman (2009), we use all the past 
information of  up to 4 lags as instruments variable. Furthermore, the model is estimated with 
GMM weights differences (AB-1-step) would resolve for un-ward (down-ward bias in standard errors 
(t-statistics) due to its dependence to estimated values (as it uses the estimated residuals from one-step 
estimator), which might lead to unrealistic asymptotic statistical inference [Judson and, Owen, (1999); 
Bond and Windmeijer (2002); Ansari and Goyal (2014)] especially in the case of data sample with 
relatively small cross section dimension [Arellano and Bond (1991)]. The Haussmann test is used for 
over-identifying restrictions based on the sample analogy of the moment conditions adapted in the 
estimation process, thereby as to determine the validity of the instrument variables (i.e. tests of the 
lack of serial correlation and consistency of instruments variables). To that, from our viewpoint, we 
consider our bank stability indicator to be a sensitive “thermometer” indicator that is affected 
contemporaneously by other factors.  
 
3.2. THE VARIABLE SELECTION APPROACH 
3.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
The empirical literature provides a good description of how one might attempt to build a composite 
indicator of stability, but obviously this paper follows the Uniform Financial Rating System approach, 
introduced by the US regulation in 1979, referred to as CAELS rating (Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk (See Table 2 in Appendix)
4
. First, using the 
statistical methods, each indicator included in each of these categorises is normalised into a common 
scale with mean of zero and standard deviation of one
5
. The formula is given as: 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Where, Xt represents the value of indicators X during period t; μ is the mean and σ is the standard 
deviation. Second, all the normalised values of the set of correlated indicators used within one 
category is then converted into a single uncorrelated index by means of the statistical procedure, 
namely the principal component analysis (PCA) approach, which is yet again standardised through the 
procedure in Eq. (3). Then, the estimated sub-index are transformed between the values [0, 1] using 
exponential transformation [1 / (1 + exp(-Z*)]. Finally, the BSI is derived as a sum of the estimated 
exponential transformed sub-indexes, as follows: 
 
                                                          
3 See also Arellano and Bover, (1995) and Blundell and Bond, (1998). 
4 This approach is also used by International Monetary Fund Compilation Guide 2006 on Financial Soundness Indicators, but others authors 
e.g. Altman (1986), Sere-Ejembi, et. al., (2014) and Cleary and Hebb (2016). 
5 Normalizing the values avoids introducing aggregation distortions arising from differences in the means of the indicators. 
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(4) 
 
   
 
(5) 
 
Where, n is the number of indicators in each sub-index; ‘C’ relates to the capital adequacy; ‘A’ 
represents a proxy to asset quality; ‘E’ represents a proxy to earnings; ‘L’ represents a proxy to 
liquidity efficiency categorises; and ‘S’ is related to the sensitivity of market risk. Z* is the 
exponential transformed simple average of the normalised values of each indicator included into the 
sub-index of the individual bank stability index. Then, the estimated index is a relatively 
measurement, where an increase in the value of the index at any particular dimension indicates a lower 
risk in this dimension for the period, compared with other periods. 
 
The advantage of this approach is fourfold. First, CAELS represents a useful “complement” to on-side 
examination, rather than a substitute for them [Betz, et. al., (201], and thereby creates an internal 
comprehensive monthly-based supervisory “thermometer” measurement to evaluate bank stability in 
real time and on an uniform basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special supervisory 
attention and concern with regards to both the present and future banking sector conditions. Second, as 
suggested by ECB (2007), it reflects more the Albanian financial structure by attaching more weight to 
banking sector as it is the most prominent agents in the financial markets, while it takes advantages of 
a broad range of bank level data. Third, the PCA approach highlights the most common factor 
identifying the patterns in the data without much loss of information, which at the same time solves for 
any problem of endogeneity mention above. Four, it does not take the probability form of the binary 
approach, which might expose it either to limitations of insufficient number of episodes or to the 
vulnerability of the methodology employed to calculate the threshold level, which might even provide 
falls banking distress signals. Rather it consists of a simpler approach that is easier to explain and 
implements and most importantly allows analysing the state of the bank as it develops and to that it is 
applicable for cross-section comparisons. Finally, the estimated index is a relatively measurement, 
where an increase in the value of the index at any particular dimension indicates a lower risk in this 
dimension for the period, compared with other periods. 
 
3.2.2. THE SET OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
The structure of bank balance sheet can influence the vulnerability of banks to both internal and 
external shocks. First, as Căpraru and Andrieş, (2015) states, most of the used structural indicator to 
quantify the level of the banking system concentration rate is the Herfindhl-Hirschanman Index (HHI) 
and the concentration rate of the top largest banks (CR). It is included on the argument that banks 
assess their performance relatively to each other on the basis of their market share [Berger and 
Bouwman (2013)]] even though in doing so they end up in a more concentrated market. Given the 
small size of the banking sector relatively to the large numbers of banks operating, it is expected to 
have a negative sign even though a positive sign is not excluded given that empirical has provided 
supportive evidence with regards to both concentration-fragility view and concentration-stability view.  
 
Second, Hughes and Mester, (2009) advocates inclusion of efficiency indicators, while Fiordelisi et. 
al., (2015) believes that supervisory authorities may allow efficient banks (with high quality 
management) a greater flexibility in terms of their overall stability condition, ceteris paribus, and vice 
versa. To that, any policy-decision by the bank authority to be more attractive or/and more competitive 
and vice versa would be reflected to the bank balance sheet income-cost indicators. Therefore, it is 
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expected to have a negative sign to our assumption that a decreasing efficiency would deteriorate bank 
health positions.  
 
Third, sufficient amount of capital, which serves as a safety cushion, is important to bank’s operations 
in that it acts as a buffer against financial loses, protecting banks from solvency risk [Betz, et. al., 
(2014)], as well as are able to fulfil minimum capital adequacy ratio under potential solvency risks 
Betz, et. al., (2014)]. Therefore, we assume any policy-making reflects the strength of capital structure 
and thereby stability is condition to their financial leverage. It is expected that solvency risk 
diminishing with higher ratio of capitalisation, which allows bank to absorb any shock that it may 
experience thereby it is expected to a positive association with bank stability. 
 
Finally, to solve the problem of omitted variable bias in the regression and capture the adverse 
macroeconomic shocks that hurt bank stability condition, we include also an economic activity and 
primary sovereignty risk indicator. The former captures the state of the economy. Thereby a higher 
economic growth or upward movement in the expectations over economic performance, which 
enhance the ability for economic agents to meet their commitments, make bank instability less likely. 
That is why we expected it will have a positive sign. The latter, present a collection of concentrated 
risks (e.g. political risk, exchange rate risk, economic risk, sovereign risk and transfer risk) associated 
with investing in a foreign country, which can reduce the expected return on an investment and must 
be taken into consideration whenever investing abroad. It is expressed as the as the spread between the 
domestic rate and a considered risk-free rate Jutasompakorn, et. al., (2014)
6
. Therefore, as Domac and 
Martinez-Peria (2003) puts forward, a higher sovereignty risk that induces a higher domestic interest 
rates make solvency condition harder and adversely affect banks solvency and making bank stress 
more prominent, and vice versa. Therefore, we expect that an increase in the sovereignty spreads 
would affect negatively bank stability.  
 
3.2.3. DATA   
 
The sample data for this study includes consists of panel data with quarterly frequency for individual 
bank balance sheet and income statement items of 16 banks operating in Albania and some 
macroeconomic indicators for the period 2008 Q04 – 2015 Q03. That includes a total panel balanced 
observations with 448 observations and 28 periods. 
 
The variables are approximated as follows. CAELS represents an individual bank stability index as 
explained in Section 3.2.1 (See also Table. 2, in Appendix). It is transformed into an index, taking as 
the base year the average performance during the year 2010 and enters the model as log-transformed. 
It is a relatively measurement, where an increase in the value of the index at any particular dimension 
indicates a lower risk in this dimension for the period, compared with other periods. EFFICIENCY is 
proxy as gross expenditure to gross income ratio. LEVERAGE presents the logarithm of the equity to 
asset ratio of individual banks. HHIA, follows the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index approach, which is 
defined as the sum of squared market shares of banks operating in the Albanian banking sector
7
. The 
macroeconomic variables are aggregated indicators that represent the state of the economy. GDP 
represents the gross domestic production. It is transformed in real terms by deflated with the 
Consumer Price Index. PSRISK represents the spread between domestic 12 months T-Bills and the 
German 12 months T-Bills. They are transformed in real terms by subtracting the respective domestic 
and German annual inflation rate. All the data represent the end-period values. They are log-
                                                          
6 These authors use the Libor and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spread on the belief that is a generous accepted widely used proxy for the 
repo haircuts. The former is the unsecured interbank borrowing rate. The latter, is a risk free rate, as it is an accurate measure of investors’ 
expectations of the effective repo rate or the monetary authority target.  
7 The HHIA is calculated using bank total asset as inputs ( , where s represents the market share of each bank in total assets in 
the market). 
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transformed, besides the PSRISK. The bank-specific variables and the stability indicator are estimated 
individually for each bank. 
 
Finally, the dataset developed for this paper has several sources. Data on GDP are taken from the 
Albanian Institute of Statistics. Data on the domestic T-Bills rate are taken from the Ministry of 
Finance. Data on German 12 months T-Bills rate and German Consumer Price Index are taken from 
Bloomberg. The rest of the data are taken from Bank of Albania.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
In this section, we discuss the empirical analysis, following a two-step approach. First, prior to the 
empirical estimation, all the data have been subject to a unit root test procedure on the argument to 
understand their properties and also to be sure that their order of integration fulfils the criteria for our 
empirical estimation approach. The latter is a pre-required condition in order to receive consistent and 
unbiased results. Therefore, the unit root test approach includes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and the Phillips-Perron (PP) Fisher Chi-square tests. The reason is twofold. First, these tests are built 
on the same null hypothesis that panel variable are stationary. Second, they are mostly used for 
unbalanced panel model, as it is our sample. Results are presented in Table 2 in Appendix. Findings 
imply that some of variables included in our specified model are integrated of order zero I(0). This 
means that they are stationary. Therefore, they enter the model in level. This set of variables includes 
HHIA, EFFICIENCY and LEVERAGE. The other variables, namely CAELS, GDP and PSRISK are 
found to be integrated of order one, I(1). This means they pose non-stationary properties. Therefore, 
they enter the model as first difference, since it will transform them into a stationary stance
8
.  
 
Then, the model specification is estimated though a dynamic panel GMM approach. The sample 
considers the period in aftermath of the global financial crises. Therefore it includes a dataset with 
quarterly data for the period 2008 Q4 – 2015 Q03, which includes a total panel balanced observations 
with 448 observations and 28 periods. The empirical model is estimated in level based on the results of 
the unit root test approach as explains previously. It includes cross-section fixed effects and makes 
uses of ‘White Cross-Section’ standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected). The Haussmann test 
(Prob. of J-Statistics) supports the validity and consistency of the instrument variables.  
 
The results of our benchmark model estimated are presented in Table 4, Eq. (1) in Appendix. The 
parameters of the variables have the expected signs. First, the extent of market concentration in the 
banking sector, HHIA, which also incorporates the effect of economies of scale in bank behaviour, has 
a negative sign. It is also statistically significant. This result suggests that that change in the overall 
concentration would have a significant impact on banking system stability, ceteris paribus. This is in 
line with Beck, et al (2006), especially Mirzaei, et al., (2013) that reports also a significant negative 
coefficient for emerging economies. Findings show that CAELS tumbles on average by nearly 0.943 
percentage point (pp) in response of a 1pp negative shock on HHIA. Additional to the relatively high 
value of the parameter of concentration variable, this evidence provides more support to the arguments 
that concentration-fragility view can be accepted and generally confirms empirical findings by Boyd, 
and De Nicoló, (2005); Boyd, et al., (2006); Uhde and Heimeshoff, (2009); Fu, et al., (2014); 
Pawlowska (2016). This indicates that with increasing competition to reduce market concentration the 
regulatory authorities should lift more constraints on large banks to peruse their business to bank 
system stability concerns. Therefore, as Fu, et al., (2014) suggests, preventing excessive concentration, 
regulators should adopt a prudent approach to evaluating merger and acquisition applications. 
                                                          
8 These results are robustness also to other unit root test approaches, including the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test and Fisher test. Data can 
be provided upon request. 
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At the macroeconomic level, GDP has the most important effect on CAELS among the other variables. 
As it is expected it shows a positive sign. It is also statistically significant at conventional level. The 
magnitude of the parameter suggests that bank stability improves by nearly 1.260pp in response of a 
1pp positive shock on output. Our results also corroborate findings by Fu, et al., (2014). This means 
that the performance of economic activity play relatively a crucial role for bank stability behaviour 
and at the same time banks place a relatively consider manner to the economic conditions in which 
they operate, since an upward movements in economic activity would improve the situation of the 
banking system through a higher financial intermediation or for low risks related to bank sovereignty 
risks
9
. At the same time, the magnitude of the coefficient higher than unitary is possible due to the fact 
that as a scale variable it capture the effect of other variables namely, exchange rate and/or inflation 
pressure. 
 
As expected, PSRISK exhibit a negative sign, complementing findings by Jutasompakorn, et al., 
(2014), but by contrast, this marginal effect is considered to be relatively small. In fact, it has the 
smallest effect among other variables. Yet it is also statistically significant at conventional level. The 
size of the parameter suggests that there exists a reverse relationship between bank stability and 
sovereignty primary risk as CAELS improves by nearly 0.026pp for any 1pp positive shock on 
PSRISK. This suggests that banks do consider shock related to primary sovereignty risk, even though 
such effects on bank stability play a relatively small effect. The reason is fourfold. First, public 
borrowing has been orientated towards longer term maturities and towards foreign borrowing. This has 
lowered the pressure on banks and at the same time has provided the market with more foreign 
liquidity. Second, the government has taken structural reforms to minimise possible fiscal risks. Third, 
but not the least, banks in Albania operates under a flexible interest rate to which they place a 
marginal fixed rate. Therefore, any negative shock that leads to an interest rate hint is reflected 
immediately to their interest barging, making them to some extend hedge to interest rate. Finally, not 
the least, different from other countries, banks in Albania have been well-capitalised and despite the 
recent trends and financial disintermediation were not vulnerable to a shortage of liquidity.  
 
All external factors analysed have influenced on bank stability, but at the same time the parameter and 
the significance of the bank-specific variables have also the expected sign and are found to be 
relatively significant. The variable of capital structure, as measured by LEVERAGE, has the most 
important effect on bank stability among the internal variables. As it is expected, the parameter unveils 
a positive sign. The size of the parameter implies that for any 1pp shock effect on LEVERAGE, the 
empirical response of CAELS is estimated to be nearly 0.6395pp. This effect is statistically significant 
at conventional level. This suggests that increasing bank capital is a very important factor and stability 
condition improves as bank become more capitalised. By contrast, based on size of the coefficient, 
bank capitalisation is the third most important factor in effecting the stability behaviour of the bank, 
under the specified model. 
 
Finally, bank operation efficiency patterns, as measure by EFFICIENCY, are found to have a negative 
relationship with their stability condition. The size of the parameter implies that a decrease by 1pp on 
EFFICIENCY boosts CAELS upward by nearly 0.4167pp. The coefficient is found to be statistically 
significant at 10% level, suggesting that efficiency in management is a robust determinant of bank 
stability. Therefore, bank should be aware that any policy-decision making to make bank more 
attractive, but that might lead to lower productivity growth (expenses that is channels to lower profits) 
would put more pressure to the stability condition. The reason is twofold. First, in order to be 
competitive and attractive, banks find may find it difficult to pass all the cost to their clients. Second, a 
                                                          
9 These results are relatively similar to the inclusion of GDP with no lags effect. 
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few large banks dictate the rule interest rate policy, so the others need to follow them, and that does 
not allow them to “overcharge”.  
 
4.2. REBOUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In this section we present the results of a set of robustness checks. This time, we focus on two types of 
robustness check. First, we analyses the results though means of alternative measure of banking sector 
concentration. Second, we add to our benchmark model also a variable that accounts for the market 
share of each respective bank, measure as the ratio of bank total asset to the sum of banking system 
total asset, SIZE. The sample consists of quarterly data for 2008 Q2 – 2015 Q3. Results are reported in 
Table 5 in Appendix. The first column reports the effect of concentration with regards to liabilities 
(HHIL). The second column reports concentration with regards to deposits (HHID). The third one 
reports results with regards to concentration of bank credit (HHIC). The last column reports the results 
of our augmented benchmark model based on the GMM approach.  
 
A glance at the results confirms previous findings. All the variables have the expected sign, albeit with 
some relative small changes on the magnitude and statistical significance level. In particular, all 
concentration indicators have a negative sign and besides HHIC are found to be statistically significant 
at conventional level. This confirms the negative relationship between banking system concentration 
and the probability of suffering a bank distress, which holds even when including alternative measures 
of concentration ratio. Therefore all of them are consistent with the concentration-fragility view. By 
contrast, results show the effect of HHIC is smaller than that related to HHID. This suggests that bank 
stability is less concerned with credit concentration patterns compared to the deposit concentration 
developments possible due to the fact that deposits comprise the main source of bank liquidity while 
the stock of loan still remains at relatively low level and banks have other forms of investing their 
liquidity. Results confirms also insensitive of the results towards the inclusion of the variable in our 
augmented model specification. Market share, as measure proxy by SIZE, has a positive sign, but is 
statistically insignificant. By contrast it has a relatively smaller explanatory power compared to the 
estimated effect of bank concentration. This suggests that concentration patterns prevails the positive 
impact of higher market share in the banking sector.  
 
Finally, as the instrumenting is technically difficult in the Arellano-Bond model, we also apply a 
standard a panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach with random effect and with fixed effect, 
including the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. This approach included also some 
fixed effect factors that distinguish for two important components, namely small versus large banks 
and foreign-owned versus domestic-owned. Results are reported in Table 6. Finding suggests results 
are also insensitive to methodological changes. They come out to be relatively similar to our findings 
through the difference GMM approach, while findings through means of fixed effects are more 
consistent and robust to the estimation through random effects
10
.  
 
 
4.3. OTHER SET OF ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: SYSTEMIC VERSUS NON-SYSTEMIC 
BANKS 
 
This section presents another set of robustness check that includes the results of concentration-stability 
nexus by splitting the sample with regards to large and small banks, which Bank of Albania 
                                                          
10 Results are also relatively robust and similar to findings when CAELS is estimated based on the simple average approach rather the PCA 
approach and the model is estimated with panel first difference GMM with the second step difference approach. Finally, they are also robust 
to the estimation of the two-step GMM estimation approach. 
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distinguish them as the systemic banks (SB) and non-systemic banks (NSB)11. The model 
specification with regards to both samples are estimated yet again through a dynamic panel GMM 
approach, which includes cross-section fixed effects and makes uses of ‘White Cross-Section’ 
standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected). Based on the unit root test approach they are estimated 
in level. The Hausmann test (Prob. of J-Statistics) supports the validity and consistency of the 
instrument variables.  
 
Column [6] in Table 4 in Appendix reports the results with regards to SB. Those referred to NBS are 
presented in Column [7]. These evidences show that splitting the sample does not alter the results, 
which are generally qualitatively similar to the main results of the core analysed in Section 4.1., albeit 
with some relative small changes on the magnitude and statistical significance level.  Most 
importantly, the negative effect of market concentration is found to be greater for NSB. This suggests 
that NSB are more fragile to concentration patterns compared to SB. In fact, results show that 
concentration has the highest effect on bank stability condition. Similarly, economic performance and 
sovereignty risk seems to have a bigger effect in the case of NSB. At the same time, results provide 
supportive evidence that efficiency is a greater concern for SB, while by contrast capital structure 
matter more for NSB. This means that as fragility concerns diminish as bank get larger and well 
capitalised at the expenses of lower operation efficiency. 
 
5. FINAL REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic, market and bank-specific 
characteristics on stability conditions of 16 banks operating in a small opened emerging economy, 
namely Albania during the period 2008 – 2015. In particular, we assessed the extent to which the 
market concentration can be attributed to bank fragility. For these reasons, we make use of a stability 
indicator of each individual bank operating in the Albanian banking sector, which consist of a wide set 
of bank balance sheet account-based information. At the same time, the adaption of the principal 
component analysis helps to solve any endogeneity problems during the empirical approach. The 
empirical study is based on the difference GMM approach. 
 
In summary, the main result of this paper indicates that concentration is negatively related to bank 
stability. This is consistent with the concentration-fragility view, but is inconsistent with the 
concentration-stability views. It reveals that bank concentration tends to enhance the likelihood that a 
country will suffer systemic bank fragility. The nexus hold even when using different indicators of 
concentration ratios and after estimation through different econometrical approaches, albeit with minor 
variation on significance changes, to a number of alternative ways to which we run the regression.  
 
In terms of other variables, the macroeconomic variables seem to have a significant effect on bank 
stability, which is not found for the sovereignty primary risk. By contrast, the bank-specific variables 
have also a significant effect on bank stability conditions. The findings can be summarised as follows. 
Bank stability is promoted through better economic performance. The trade-offs with stability 
condition is observed in relation to the efficiency operations. Moreover, stability appears to be 
promoted in line with higher market share and higher capital ratio. The latter seems to have the highest 
effect among the bank-specific variables. Similarly, small banks are found to be more sensitive to 
market concentration and macroeconomic risks. Finally, capital plays a greater role for non-systemic 
banks, while the trade-offs of stability-efficiency is found to be greater for larger banks 
                                                          
11 SB includes 6 biggest banks, namely, Apha Bank, Tirana Bank, Credins, National Commercial Bank, Raiffeisen Bank, Intesa San Paolo 
Bank. This group holds nearly 80% of the banking system assets and are among the main credit provider to the public and private sector. The 
NSB includes the other 10 banks. 
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Beyond the scope of this paper, future work should focus to the fact that further research is needed to 
develop indicators that adequately map increasing bank cross-section exposures risk that came 
importantly during the recent financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. First, we have to control for the 
robustness check of our bank fragility index by constructing an index that includes also a sub-index on 
Management, such that our index becomes under the criterion of CAMELS. Second, while we found 
supportive evidence on the concentration-fragility view, we do not explore the channels though which 
competitiveness impact bank stability as concentration is an insufficient measure of bank 
competitiveness. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Graph 1. Concentration – Stability Nexus Evidence from Albanian banking System,  
in annual growth rate. 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 1. Indicators of Bank Stability Index.  
Category Indicator Notation 
Sub-
Index 
Capital Capital Adequacy Ratio C1 
ZC 
Core Capital/Total Asset  C2 
Equity/Total Asset C3 
Asset growth  C4 
Equity Growth  C5 
Fixed Asset/Regulatory Capital  C6 
ROE C7 
Non-Performing Loan (net)/Regulatory Capital C*8 
Asset 
Quality 
Non-Performing Loan (net)/Total Loan (net) A
*
1 
ZA 
Total Loan (net)/Total Asset A2 
Growth of Loan Portfolio  A3 
Credit Loss (Gross)/Total Loan (Gross) A
*
4 
Large Risks (the number of beneficiaries over rate) A*5 
Provisions for Loan Loss Coverage/Non-Performing Loan (gross)  A
*
6 
Earnings ROA E1 
ZE 
The growth of revenue from interest E2 
Interest revenue/Total Revenue E3 
Net Interest Margin E4 
Efficiency Ratio E5 
Interest Revenue (Net)/Operating Revenues (Gross) E6 
Dividend/Income (Net) E7 
The growth of net interest revenue E8 
Liquidity Net Loan/Average Deposits L1 
ZL 
Active Liquid/Total Asset L2 
Asset – Passive with a maturity of three months/Total Asset that provide 
profit 
L3 
Sensitivity 
to Market 
Risk 
Asset – Passive sensitive to interest rate with a maturity up to 3 
months/Total Asset that Provide Profit   
S*1 
ZS Asset – Passive sensitive to interest rate with a maturity up to 12 
months/Total Asset that Provide Profit   
S*2 
Net Open Position in foreign currency S*3 
* linked to reverse risk order 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Analysis: Ordinary 
Sample: 2008Q2 2015Q3 
Included observations: 480 
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion) 
 
CAELS GDP PSRISK HHIA EFFICIENCY LEVERAGE 
CAELS 1      
GDP 0.1042 1     
PSRISK -0.0709 -0.0162 1    
HHIA -0.0494 0.3563 0.3413 1   
EFFICIENCY -0.0921 -0.0366 -0.0302 -0.0311 1  
LEVERAGE 0.0029 0.0073 0.0454 0.0693 0.3763 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test. 
Variable 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
Intercept 
Intercept 
and 
Trend 
None Intercept 
Intercept 
and 
Trend 
None 
ΔCAELS [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔGDP [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔPSRISK [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔSIZE [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
HHIA [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
HHIL [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
HHID [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
HHIC [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
EFFICIENCY [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9649] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.8965] 
LEVERAGE [0.0000[ [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0006] [0.0010] 
Note: Δ is a first difference operator. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed 
using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 4. Empirical results on CAELS through means of GMM approach. 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
ΔGDP 
1.2604 1.155 1.1067 0.9076 1.2907 0.4525 1.2374 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.39] [0.03] 
ΔPSRISK 
-0.0258 -0.0350 -0.0418 -0.0348 -0.0228 -0.0352 -0.0665 
[0.08] [0.02] [0.06] [0.00] [0.16] [0.03] [0.01] 
SIZE 
    0.2165   
    [0.21]   
HHIA 
-0.9430    -0.9094 -0.9043 -1.3646 
[0.03]    [0.03] [0.06] [0.00] 
HHIL 
 -0.7620      
 [0.00]      
HHID 
  -0.4380     
  [0.02]     
HHIC 
   -0.2684    
   [0.39]    
EFFICIENCY 
-0.4167 -0.4125 -0.4432 -0.4607 -0.4517 -0.4027 -0.3185 
[0.09] [0.16] [0.07] [0.00] [0.06] [0.06] [0.28] 
LEVERAGE 
0.6395 0.3110 0.3551 0.0185 0.7048 0.0834 0.4716 
[0.00] [0.07] [0.05] [0.79] [0.00] [0.64] [0.03] 
Cross-sections included: 480 16 16 16 16 6 10 
Total panel observations: 16 464 448 464 480 174 280 
Probability (J-statistic) 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.42 0.29 0.33 0.22 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 5. Empirical results on CAELS through means of OLS approach. 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
C 
1.5152 1.8121 1.5152 1.5780 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
ΔGDP 
0.7592 0.7440 0.7592 0.7576 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
ΔPSRISK 
-0.0051 -0.0057 -0.0051 -0.0034 
[0.43] [0.40] [0.43] [0.63] 
HHIA 
-0.4225 -0.4435 -0.4225 -0.4034 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
EFFICIENCY 
-0.0944 -0.1521 -0.0944 -0.1148 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
LEVERAGE 
0.0165 0.0276 0.0165 0.0118 
[0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.01] 
ΔCAELS(-1) 
-0.3283 -0.3404 -0.3283 -0.3341 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
D_CRISIS    
-0.0094 
   
[0.26] 
D_OWNERSHIP    
0.0042 
   
[0.57] 
D_SIZE    
-0.0228 
   
[0.01] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 
DW Statistics 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Effects specification None FE RE RE 
Periods included 30 30 30 30 
Cross-sections included: 16 16 16 16 
Total panel observations: 480 480 480 480 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
